CC personal-wechat
Operate the user's personal WeChat account through their self-hosted Wisdom service (BYOC) — check status, read chats, search contacts, browse Moments, and (after explicit confirmation) send messages, share web links as native cards, or manage group chats. Use for personal WeChat messages, contacts, groups, Moments, or sharing a page to a chat.
Operate the user's personal WeChat account through their self-hosted Wisdom service (BYOC) — check status, read chats, search contacts, browse Moments, and…
As a process C 55/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions
What is at stake
Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".
If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.
How to improve
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 1
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 1
-
medium Exfiltration
net-redirectable-api-keyscripts/personal_wechat.py:18Helper sends the API key to a host configured by an environment variable — the key can be redirected to another serverAPI key + configurable base URL from environment
Files scanned: 3. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "connections" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "allowed_tools" - note
edit-residuethe text marks something as outdated (lines 61): check that old rules are not kept next to new ones — the full check reads the text for contradictions
Process rating: all ten parameters 55/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 30Running it twice. 28 mutating operations with no state check
- 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, python) that frontmatter does not declare
- 100Steps. 13 steps
- 100Failures and branches. 2 branches, has a failure section
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2871 tokens
- 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
- medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- -31 of 2 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
- +2Single-language instructions
- +3Description length 346: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 20 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 13 items
- +4Has examples (21 code blocks)
- +1License stated
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 80.