BC capacitor-security
App-level security audit and hardening for Capacitor apps. Use when the user wants a security review, OWASP MASVS check, or pentest fixes; runs the Capgo scanner (`npx @capgo/capgo-sec scan`, `capsec`, rule IDs like SEC001, NET003, CAP004); finds API keys or `.env` values in the web bundle; stores tokens in `@capacitor/preferences` or `localStorage`; needs Keychain/Keystore storage, certificate pinning, CSP, or root/jailbreak detection; or sees `server.cleartext`, `allowNavigation`, `webContentsDebuggingEnabled`, `NSAllowsArbitraryLoads`, `android:usesCleartextTraffic`, `android:allowBackup`, `net::ERR_CLEARTEXT_NOT_PERMITTED`, or ATS "requires the use of a secure connection" errors. Do not use for Xcode build-setting hardening (use capacitor-ios-security-hardening), deep link setup (capacitor-deep-linking), App Store review (capacitor-apple-review-preflight), CI design (capacitor-ci-cd), or live update setup (capgo-live-updates).
App-level security audit and hardening for Capacitor apps.
As a process C 63/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, running it twice
How to improve
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 2
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 2
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:3Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)description: App-level security audit and hardening for Capacitor apps. Use when the user wants a security review, OWASP MASVS check, or pentest fixes; runs the Capgo scanner (`npx @capgo/capgo-sec sc
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:13Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)- The user asks for a security audit, OWASP Mobile Top 10 / MASVS review, or wants to fix pentest findings.
Files scanned: 7. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- note
edit-residuethe text marks something as outdated (lines 98): check that old rules are not kept next to new ones — the full check reads the text for contradictions
Process rating: all ten parameters 63/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 30Running it twice. 1 mutating operations with no state check
- 60Tools and files. Uses tools (web, node) that frontmatter does not declare
- 100Steps. 31 steps
- 100When it triggers. States when to use and when not to
- 100Failures and branches. 1 branches, has a failure section
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2285 tokens
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +3Description length 944: 120–800 characters recommended
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- -2localhost URLs: will not work for another user
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +4Description says when NOT to use the skill
- +4Structure: 8 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 31 items
- +4Has examples (2 code blocks)
- +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (5 of 5)
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 87.