CB 1c-form-compile
Компиляция управляемой формы 1С из JSON-определения или из метаданных объекта. Используй когда нужно создать форму с нуля по описанию элементов или сгенерировать типовую форму
Компиляция управляемой формы 1С из JSON-определения или из метаданных объекта.
As a process B 69/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: result and completion, running it twice, progress reporting
What is at stake
Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.
Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The files contain invisible characters, encoded commands or comments hidden from readers but visible to the model. What you read differs from what the agent sees.
Remove invisible characters (they usually sneak in through copy-paste) and encoded strings: no catalog will pass them. Instructions for the model must be readable by a human too.
How to improve
- Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
- The SKILL.md body is over 5,000 tokens: move reference detail into references/ and load it when needed.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 2
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 2
-
medium Broad scope
meta-broad-allowed-toolsSKILL.md:1Broad tool permissions pre-approved: Bashallowed-tools: Bash Read Write Glob
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medium Obfuscation
uni-mixed-script-wordSKILL.md:468Word mixing Latin and Cyrillic letters (homoglyph obfuscation) (1 occurrence)- `<extInfo xsi:type="form:ТипFormExtInfo"/>` на корневом `form:Form` - тип формы:
Files scanned: 5. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- warning
description-no-whendescription does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when") - warning
body-longSKILL.md body ≈ 5999 tokens (recommended < 5000); move details to references/
Process rating: all ten parameters 69/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 30Running it twice. 1 mutating operations with no state check
- 60Failures and branches. 2 branches
- 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
- 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
- 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 5999 tokens
- 100Tools and files. Tools declared in frontmatter
- 100Steps. 48 steps
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- low 10 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
- low The response is described with custom markup (9 tags): a typed call is more reliable
- medium 3 test cases, all positive: not one "should refuse" or "should ask first"
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- -31 of 2 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
- +1No license
- +3Description length 175: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 36 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 48 items
- +4Has examples (11 code blocks)
- +2Bilingual instructions (RU + EN)
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 61.