DB ccboard
Launch and navigate the ccboard TUI/Web dashboard for Claude Code. Use when monitoring token usage, tracking costs, browsing sessions, or checking MCP server status across projects.
Launch and navigate the ccboard TUI/Web dashboard for Claude Code.
As a process B 71/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, progress reporting
What is at stake
The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.
The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.
Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.
How to improve
- Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 4
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high Dangerous commands
cmd-pipe-to-shellcommands/install.md:29Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell)curl --proto '=https' --tlsv1.2 -sSf https://sh.rustup.rs | sh
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high Dangerous commands
cmd-pipe-to-shellcommands/install.md:72Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell)curl --proto '=https' --tlsv1.2 -sSf https://sh.rustup.rs | sh
Medium and low: 2
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medium Dangerous commands
cmd-shell-rccommands/install.md:92Writes to a shell startup fileecho 'export PATH="$HOME/.cargo/bin:$PATH"' >> ~/.bashrc
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medium Dangerous commands
cmd-pipe-to-shellscripts/install-ccboard.sh:24Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (string literal in code, not executed)echo " curl --proto '=https' --tlsv1.2 -sSf https://sh.rustup.rs | sh"
code literal
Files scanned: 11. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "effort"
Process rating: all ten parameters 71/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
- 100Tools and files. Tools declared in frontmatter
- 100Steps. 128 steps
- 100Failures and branches. 1 branches, has a failure section
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2385 tokens
- 100Running it twice. No mutating operations
- low 14 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- -2localhost URLs: will not work for another user
- -32 of 2 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +3Description length 181: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 41 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 128 items
- +4Has examples (12 code blocks)
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 78.