CB eval-hooks
Audit Claude Code and Codex hooks for validity, safety, and correctness across settings.json, hooks.json, config.toml, plugin, and skill or agent frontmatter hooks. Resolves each command, checks event names, handler types, matchers, exit-code and JSON decision strategy, and timeouts against each host's documented rules, then reviews hooks one by one. Use when setting up hooks, debugging a hook that never fires, never blocks, or hangs the agent, or doing a periodic hooks hygiene pass. Not for writing a new hook from scratch.
Audit Claude Code and Codex hooks for validity, safety, and correctness across settings.json, hooks.json, config.toml, plugin, and skill or agent frontmatter…
As a process B 71/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, execution cost
What is at stake
Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.
Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.
How to improve
- The SKILL.md body is over 5,000 tokens: move reference detail into references/ and load it when needed.
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 2
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 2
-
medium Broad scope
meta-broad-allowed-toolsSKILL.md:1Broad tool permissions pre-approved: Bashallowed-tools: Read Glob Bash Edit
A further 1 matches are quotations in this security skill's documentation and are not counted as findings.
Files scanned: 1. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- warning
body-longSKILL.md body ≈ 8341 tokens (recommended < 5000); move details to references/ - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "effort" - note
edit-residuethe text marks something as outdated (lines 201, 228): check that old rules are not kept next to new ones — the full check reads the text for contradictions
Process rating: all ten parameters 71/100
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 40Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 40Execution cost. Instruction body is 8341 tokens: crowds the task out of the window
- 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 100Tools and files. Tools declared in frontmatter
- 100Steps. 91 steps
- 100Failures and branches. 1 branches, has a failure section
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
- 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
- medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- -214 emoji in the instructions: noise for the model
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +4Description says when NOT to use the skill
- +3Description length 529: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 27 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 91 items
- +4Has examples (7 code blocks)
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 75.