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CD peer-review

Systematic peer review toolkit. Evaluate methodology, statistics, design, reproducibility, ethics, figure integrity, reporting standards, for manuscript and grant review across disciplines.

FreedomIntelligence/OpenClaw-Medical-Skills Agent Skills author: FreedomIntelligence 3 files body ≈ 5 634 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 11 h ago

Systematic peer review toolkit.

As a process D 47/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

AnalyzerData and analyticstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
C
88/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
95
Quality 40%
78
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
47/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

The same skill appears in 1 more place: RA-Skills

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Broad scope medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.

For the author

Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.

How to improve

  1. The SKILL.md body is over 5,000 tokens: move reference detail into references/ and load it when needed.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 1

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 1
  • medium Broad scope meta-broad-allowed-tools SKILL.md:1
    Broad tool permissions pre-approved: Bash
    allowed-tools: Read Write Edit Bash

Files scanned: 3. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning body-long SKILL.md body ≈ 5634 tokens (recommended < 5000); move details to references/

Process rating: all ten parameters 47/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 1 mutating operations with no state check
  • 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 5634 tokens
  • 85Steps. 300 steps, 3 vague phrases
  • 100Tools and files. Tools declared in frontmatter
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 189: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 40 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 300 items
  • +4Has examples (5 code blocks)
  • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (2 of 2)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 78.