BC mcp-integration
This skill should be used when the user asks to "add MCP server", "integrate MCP", "configure MCP in plugin", "use .mcp.json", "set up Model Context Protocol", "connect external service", mentions "${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT} with MCP", or discusses MCP server types (SSE, stdio, HTTP, WebSocket). Provides comprehensive guidance for integrating Model Context Protocol servers into Claude Code plugins for external tool and service integration.
This skill should be used when the user asks to "add MCP server", "integrate MCP", "configure MCP in plugin", "use .mcp.json", "set up Model Context…
As a process C 52/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, running it twice
The same skill appears in 1 more place: RA-Skills
What is at stake
Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".
If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.
How to improve
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 2
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 2
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medium Exfiltration
net-credential-usereferences/authentication.md:398Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)curl -H "Authorization: Bearer $API_TOKEN" \
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low Exfiltration
read-dotenvreferences/authentication.md:223Reads a .env fileLoad with: \`source .env\` or \`export $(cat .env | xargs)\`
Files scanned: 7. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec
Process rating: all ten parameters 52/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 30Running it twice. 7 mutating operations with no state check
- 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
- 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash) that frontmatter does not declare
- 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
- 85Steps. 126 steps, 1 vague phrases
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2995 tokens
- medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
- low 16 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- -218 emoji in the instructions: noise for the model
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +5Description quotes 7 example trigger phrases
- +3Description length 438: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 48 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 126 items
- +4Has examples (20 code blocks)
- +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (3 of 3)
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 91.