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Use when challenging ideas, plans, decisions, or proposals using structured critical reasoning. Invoke to play devil's advocate, run a pre-mortem, red team, or audit evidence and assumptions.

Jeffallan/claude-skills Agent Skills author: Jeffallan MIT 7 files body ≈ 1 426 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 6 d ago

Invoke to play devil's advocate, run a pre-mortem, red team, or audit evidence and assumptions.

As a process C 59/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: when it triggers, inputs and preconditions, failures and branches

ProcedureAI and agentsWriting and documentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) OpenClaw Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
C
86/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
85
Quality 40%
88
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
59/100
Has gaps
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 15

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 15
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/mode-selection-guide.md:14
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      | "Is this secure/safe?" | Red Team | Security and adversarial framing |
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/mode-selection-guide.md:19
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      | "No one would ever..." | Red Team | Assumptions about adversary behavior |
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/mode-selection-guide.md:27
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      | Architecture decision | Pre-mortem Analysis | Red Team |
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/mode-selection-guide.md:29
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      | Security design | Red Team | Pre-mortem Analysis |
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/mode-selection-guide.md:35
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      | Risk assessment | Red Team | Pre-mortem Analysis |
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/red-team-adversarial.md:1
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      # Red Team Adversarial
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/red-team-adversarial.md:3
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      Adversarial thinking and red teaming for finding weaknesses before adversaries do.
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/red-team-adversarial.md:7
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      Red teaming asks: **"If someone wanted to break, exploit, or game this, how would they do it?"** The Fool adopts the mindset of an adversary — not to cause harm, but to find vulnerabilities before rea
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/red-team-adversarial.md:37
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      | **Disgruntled Insider** | Revenge, financial gain | Privilege escalation, data exfiltration, sabotage |
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/red-team-adversarial.md:123
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      ## Red Team Analysis: [Target]
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:3
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      description: Use when challenging ideas, plans, decisions, or proposals using structured critical reasoning. Invoke to play devil's advocate, run a pre-mortem, red team, or audit evidence and assumpti
      quoted
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:10
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      triggers: play the fool, devil's advocate, challenge this, stress test, poke holes, what could go wrong, red team, pre-mortem, test my assumptions
      quoted
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:54
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      - "Find weaknesses" → Ask: "Find failure modes" (Pre-mortem) vs "Attack this" (Red team)
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:65
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      | Attack This | Red teaming | Adversary profile, attack vectors, defenses |
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:75
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      | Red team adversarial | `references/red-team-adversarial.md` | "Attack this" selected |

    Files scanned: 7. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 59/100

    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 30Running it twice. 2 mutating operations with no state check
    • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
    • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
    • 100Steps. 34 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1426 tokens

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +4No input/output examples
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 191: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 11 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 34 items
    • +3Output format is stated explicitly
    • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (6 of 6)
    • +1License stated

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 88.