BC relsa-severity-assessment
Supports multivariate severity assessment and exploratory endpoint-time score forecasting for laboratory animal studies using the RELSA (RELative Severity Assessment) score and ARIMA-based foRcast forecasting. Use when combining welfare readouts — body weight or weight loss, body temperature, clinical or nesting scores, biomarkers, activity, heart rate, burrowing, wheel running — into one severity score per animal per day, when asking which animals are at risk of reaching a humane endpoint at a specified future observation time, when defining attention/danger zones or thresholds on a severity scale by kernel density estimation, or when reporting severity for a 3Rs, refinement, animal-welfare, or EU Directive 2010/63/EU severity-assessment context. Covers directionality ("turned" variables), baseline normalization, reference sets, RELSA weights, ARIMA prediction intervals, and RMSE/PICP/MPIW evaluation.
Supports multivariate severity assessment and exploratory endpoint-time score forecasting for laboratory animal studies using the RELSA (RELative Severity…
As a process C 51/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions
What is at stake
Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.
Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.
How to improve
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 1
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 1
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medium Broad scope
meta-broad-allowed-toolsSKILL.md:1Broad tool permissions pre-approved: Bashallowed-tools: Read Write Edit Bash
Files scanned: 9. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- note
edit-residuethe text marks something as outdated (lines 95): check that old rules are not kept next to new ones — the full check reads the text for contradictions
Process rating: all ten parameters 51/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
- 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 30Running it twice. 13 mutating operations with no state check
- 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 4901 tokens
- 100Tools and files. Tools declared in frontmatter
- 100Steps. 46 steps
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
- medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
- low 11 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Description length 915: 120–800 characters recommended
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- +2Single-language instructions
- +4Structure: 20 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 46 items
- +4Has examples (9 code blocks)
- +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (3 of 3)
- +3All 4 scripts are documented
- +1License stated
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 89.