SKILLEMALL.ai
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FD kanecli-skill

Browser automation + AI test authoring via kane-cli - run browser objectives, generate & refine test scenarios/cases from a description, design requirement-linked test suites from a PRD/spec (assurance), parse NDJSON output, inspect logs, save runnable _test.md. Use for any task requiring a real browser (navigate, click, fill forms, test web UI, take screenshots), or to author test cases, quick cases from a description via kane-cli generate; a designed, coverage-accounted suite from requirement documents via the assurance commands. Never write test cases by hand. Also runs mobile app tests - native Android app on a virtual emulator or iOS app on a simulator via --target emulator|simulator (desktop browser stays the default target): locally on macOS Apple Silicon, or on the LambdaTest cloud grid from any machine via kane-cli testrun run --remote. Also shares the assurance store (.context/) with a team through a location (a GitHub repository, an S3-compatible bucket, or a folder) via kane-cli context sync, and resolves the decisions a sync rebase asks.

Not recommendedcritical or high security findings · low grade F
LambdaTest/agent-skills Agent Skills author: LambdaTest 25 files · 2 scripts body ≈ 8 208 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 31 h ago

Browser automation + AI test authoring via kane-cli - run browser objectives, generate & refine test scenarios/cases from a description, design…

As a process D 48/100 · Unfinished process — References files that are not bundled: <test_url>

IntegrationGitHubPlaywrightSoftware developmentAI and agentsWriting and documentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) OpenClaw Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
F
47/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
58
Quality 40%
31
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
48/100
Unfinished process
References files that are not bundled: <test_url>
Tools and files w 18
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Running it twice w 4
30
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Exfiltration
If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

  1. Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
  2. Shorten the description to 1024 characters.
  3. The SKILL.md body is over 5,000 tokens: move reference detail into references/ and load it when needed.
  4. The text references files that are not there: add them or drop the references.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 4

  • high Exfiltration intent-browser-credential-store references/objectives-cookbook.md:1
    Accesses a browser credential / cookie store
    <!-- Read this when authoring objective strings — for either `kane-cli run "..."` or step bodies inside a `_test.md`. Owns the full catalog of action verbs, assertion patterns, checkpoint analyze meth
  • high Exfiltration intent-browser-credential-store SKILL.md:234
    Accesses a browser credential / cookie store
    > For the full catalog — every action verb, every assertion analyze method (Visual / Textual-DOM / URL / Title / DevTools→Network/Console/Performance/Cookies/localStorage/Clipboard), direct API calls,
Medium and low: 2
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-execpolicy-bypass references/ready-check.md:16
    Runs PowerShell with execution policy bypassed
    powershell -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File "<skill dir>\scripts\pref…ps1"
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token references/context-sync.md:66
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    {"type":"sync_rebase_decision","v":1,"verb":"sync","rebase_id":"2026…set","decision_id":"h3","kind":"slug","intent":"names","seq":3,"label":"names spec","location":"origin","mine
    quoted

Files scanned: 25. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • error description-long description is 1066 chars, limit 1024
  • warning frontmatter-yaml SKILL.md: the frontmatter is not valid YAML (YAML parse error: Nested mappings are not allowed in compact mappings at line 2, column 14: description: Browser automation + AI test authoring via kane-cli - run browser … ^ ); fields were read line by line. The usual cause is a colon inside an unquoted value
  • warning body-long SKILL.md body ≈ 8208 tokens (recommended < 5000); move details to references/
  • warning missing-ref reference to a missing file: <test_url>

Process rating: all ten parameters 48/100

Will not run. References files that are not bundled: <test_url>
  • 0Tools and files. 1 referenced file(s) missing: <test_url>
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 30Running it twice. 11 mutating operations with no state check
  • 40Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 40Execution cost. Instruction body is 8208 tokens: crowds the task out of the window
  • 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 85Steps. 32 steps, 1 vague phrases
  • 100Failures and branches. 2 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
  • low The response is described with custom markup (20 tags): a typed call is more reliable

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 1066: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -31 of 2 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 24 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 32 items
  • +4Has examples (11 code blocks)
  • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (22 of 22)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 31.