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BB 1m-trade

Integrated on-chain operations hub: integrates BlockBeats market intelligence, Hyperliquid DEX trading via `hl1m`, wallet creation and management at https://www.1m-trade.com, and supports local initialization using `hl1m init-wallet` (wallet address + proxy private key, never use the main wallet private key). Supports fully autonomous AI trading.

LeoYeAI/openclaw-master-skills Agent Skills author: LeoYeAI MIT 4 files body ≈ 4 653 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 2 d ago

Integrated on-chain operations hub: integrates BlockBeats market intelligence, Hyperliquid DEX trading via hl1m, wallet creation and management at…

As a process B 68/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: progress reporting

IntegrationData and analyticsAI and agentsWriting and documentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
87/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
85
Quality 40%
91
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
68/100
Nearly there
Progress reporting w 2
0
When it triggers w 12
50
Tools and files w 18
60
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Risky intent medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The purpose itself is risky: wallets, browser password stores, offensive security. Even an honest implementation gives the agent access to things that cost money.

For the author

Explain in the description why the access is needed and how it is limited; add tests that show refusals on dangerous requests.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 3

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 3
    • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets SKILL.md:4
      Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
      Integrated on-chain operations hub: integrates BlockBeats market intelligence, Hyperliquid DEX trading via `hl1m`, wallet creation and management at https://www.…com, and supports local initia
    • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets SKILL.md:136
      Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
      | Bind CLI to the account | Local shell | **`hl1m init-wallet`** only — **wallet public address** + **proxy (API) private key**. **Never** use the **main / master** wallet private key. |
    • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets SKILL.md:171
      Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
      2. Point to **[1M-Trade](https://www.…com)** for wallet creation/management as needed, then Workflow 2: if the user already sent labeled `wallet address` + `proxy private key` (or equivalent),

    Files scanned: 4. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 68/100

    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web, python, node) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 60Steps. 105 steps, 5 vague phrases
    • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
    • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
    • 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 4653 tokens
    • 100Failures and branches. 10 branches, has a failure section
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
    • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
    • low The response is described with custom markup (19 tags): a typed call is more reliable

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +4Description says when NOT to use the skill
    • +3Description length 348: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 21 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 105 items
    • +3Output format is stated explicitly
    • +4Has examples (6 code blocks)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 91.