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BC ai-news-aggregator-sl

Fetches AI & tech news (default) or any custom topic (crypto, geopolitics, etc.) from RSS feeds, Tavily search, Twitter/X, and YouTube. Writes an English editorial digest using OpenAI by default (or DeepSeek / Claude), then posts it to Discord. Supports any time range (today, last 3 days, last week). Trigger when user asks for news, a digest, trending topics, or YouTube updates on any subject.

LeoYeAI/openclaw-master-skills Agent Skills author: LeoYeAI MIT 4 files body ≈ 1 857 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 2 d ago

Fetches AI & tech news (default) or any custom topic (crypto, geopolitics, etc.) from RSS feeds, Tavily search, Twitter/X, and YouTube. Writes an English…

As a process C 51/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, failures and branches

IntegrationDiscordYouTubeAI and agentsMedia and videotype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
86/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
88
Quality 40%
84
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
51/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Exfiltration medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 4

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 4
    • medium Exfiltration net-redirectable-api-key news_aggregator.py:68
      Helper sends the API key to a host configured by an environment variable — the key can be redirected to another server
      API key + configurable base URL from environment
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-autorun-instruction SKILL.md:102
      Instructs the agent to auto-run a script on every session
      **IMPORTANT:** Always run `news_aggregator.py` using the steps below. Do NOT search the web manually or improvise a response — the script handles all fetching, summarisation, and Discord posting.
    • low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url news_aggregator.py:36
      Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (placeholder value)
      - https://discord.com/api/webhooks/...           (always, required)
      placeholder
    • low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url SKILL.md:49
      Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (placeholder value)
      | `https://discord.com/api/webhooks/...` | Post digest to Discord | Always (required) |
      placeholder

    Files scanned: 4. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 51/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
    • 30Running it twice. 1 mutating operations with no state check
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
    • 100Steps. 10 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1857 tokens
    • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 396: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 12 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 10 items
    • +4Has examples (6 code blocks)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 84.