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BD openclaw

Comprehensive guide for installing, configuring, operating, and troubleshooting OpenClaw — a self-hosted, multi-channel AI agent gateway. Use when the user asks about OpenClaw setup, configuration, channel management (WhatsApp/Telegram/Discord/Slack/iMessage/etc.), model provider setup, Gateway operations, multi-agent routing, security hardening, troubleshooting, or any maintenance task related to their local OpenClaw installation. Also use when encountering errors from `openclaw` CLI commands or the Gateway daemon.

LeoYeAI/openclaw-master-skills Agent Skills author: LeoYeAI MIT 55 files body ≈ 4 624 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 2 d ago

Comprehensive guide for installing, configuring, operating, and troubleshooting OpenClaw — a self-hosted, multi-channel AI agent gateway.

As a process D 44/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, consistency

IntegrationTelegramWhatsAppDiscordSlackAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
82/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
80
Quality 40%
86
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
44/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Running it twice w 4
30
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

The same skill appears in 1 more place: openclaw-master-skills

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

Broad scope medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.

For the author

Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 12

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 12
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence references/gateway_ops.md:339
      Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (documentation of a security skill)
      launchctl bootstrap gui/$(id -u) ~/Library/LaunchAgents/ai.openclaw.gateway.plist
      security skill
    • medium Broad scope meta-agent-memory-dump references/heartbeat.md
      Agent memory / workspace files bundled with the skill (2) — likely a workspace dump with personal data or tokens
      references/heartbeat.md, references/memory.md
    • low Concealment en-hide-from-user references/exec.md:38
      Instruction to hide actions from the user (negated — the text forbids it)
      - **Sandboxing off + `host=sandbox`**: Exec fails closed (does not silently run on gateway). Enable sandboxing or use `host=gateway` with approvals.
      negated
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process references/gateway_ops.md:77
      Starts a background / autostarted process (documentation of a security skill)
      sudo systemctl enable --now openclaw-gateway.service
      security skill
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell references/gateway_ops.md:208
      Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (documentation of a security skill; the skill's own vendor host)
      curl -fsSL https://openclaw.ai/install.sh | bash
      security skillvendor-host
    • low Exfiltration read-dotenv references/gateway_ops.md:298
      Reads a .env file (documentation of a security skill)
      cat ~/.openclaw/.env
      security skill
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell references/install.md:26
      Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (documentation of a security skill; the skill's own vendor host)
      curl -fsSL https://openclaw.ai/install.sh | bash
      security skillvendor-host
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell references/install.md:35
      Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (documentation of a security skill; the skill's own vendor host)
      curl -fsSL https://openclaw.ai/install.sh | bash -s -- --no-onboard
      security skillvendor-host
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell references/install.md:127
      Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (documentation of a security skill; the skill's own vendor host)
      curl -fsSL https://openclaw.ai/install.sh | bash
      security skillvendor-host
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell SKILL.md:279
      Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (documentation of a security skill; the skill's own vendor host)
      curl -fsSL https://openclaw.ai/install.sh | bash
      security skillvendor-host

    A further 2 matches are quotations in this security skill's documentation and are not counted as findings.

    Files scanned: 55. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 44/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 30Running it twice. 2 mutating operations with no state check
    • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (openclaw) differs from the folder (bengii-gemini-fix)
    • 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web, node) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 60Steps. 27 steps, 6 vague phrases
    • 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
    • 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 4624 tokens
    • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
    • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • -2localhost URLs: will not work for another user
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 521: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 19 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 27 items
    • +4Has examples (11 code blocks)
    • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (51 of 51)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 86.