BB qa
Systematically QA test a web application and fix bugs found. Runs QA testing, then iteratively fixes bugs in source code, committing each fix atomically and re-verifying. Use when asked to "qa", "QA", "test this site", "find bugs", "test and fix", or "fix what's broken". Three tiers: Quick (critical/high only), Standard (+ medium), Exhaustive (+ cosmetic). Produces before/after health scores, fix evidence, and a ship-readiness summary. For report-only mode, use /qa-only.
Systematically QA test a web application and fix bugs found.
As a process B 70/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: when it triggers, inputs and preconditions
What is at stake
Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.
Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.
How to improve
- The SKILL.md body is over 5,000 tokens: move reference detail into references/ and load it when needed.
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 2
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 2
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medium Broad scope
meta-broad-allowed-toolsSKILL.md:1Broad tool permissions pre-approved: Bashallowed-tools: Bash Read Write Edit Glob Grep AskUserQuestion
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low Dangerous commands
cmd-pipe-to-shell-known-hostSKILL.md:158Pipe-to-shell installer from a well-known host (still executes remote code) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)3. If `bun` is not installed: `curl -fsSL https://bun.sh/install | bash`
quoted
Files scanned: 3. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- warning
body-longSKILL.md body ≈ 5671 tokens (recommended < 5000); move details to references/
Process rating: all ten parameters 70/100
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
- 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 5671 tokens
- 85Steps. 140 steps, 1 vague phrases
- 100Tools and files. Tools declared in frontmatter
- 100Failures and branches. 6 branches, has a failure section
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
- 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
- medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
- low 20 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
- low The response is described with custom markup (3 tags): a typed call is more reliable
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- -5TODO / placeholder text left in the skill
- -2localhost URLs: will not work for another user
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +5Description quotes 4 example trigger phrases
- +3Description length 475: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 46 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 140 items
- +3Output format is stated explicitly
- +4Has examples (23 code blocks)
- +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (1 of 1)
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 79.