AC siyuan-notes-skill
思源笔记工具——搜索、阅读、编辑、组织用户的笔记。Use when user says: 搜索笔记、查找文档、打开文档、阅读笔记、编辑笔记、创建文档、修改块、思源笔记、SiYuan、整理文档、管理标签、Daily Note、反向链接、最近修改、PMF补丁、SQL查询blocks。不要用于与思源笔记无关的通用编程或问答任务。
思源笔记工具——搜索、阅读、编辑、组织用户的笔记。Use when user says: 搜索笔记、查找文档、打开文档、阅读笔记、编辑笔记、创建文档、修改块、思源笔记、SiYuan、整理文档、管理标签、Daily…
As a process C 59/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: when it triggers, inputs and preconditions, failures and branches
What is at stake
Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".
If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.
Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.
How to improve
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 3
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 3
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medium Exfiltration
net-redirectable-api-keyindex.js:112Helper sends the API key to a host configured by an environment variable — the key can be redirected to another serverAPI key + configurable base URL from environment
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medium Broad scope
meta-broad-allowed-toolsSKILL.md:1Broad tool permissions pre-approved: Bashallowed-tools: Bash
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low Exfiltration
read-dotenvindex.js:596Reads a .env file (quoted — discussed, not commanded)cp .env.example .env
quoted
Files scanned: 15. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec
Process rating: all ten parameters 59/100
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 30Running it twice. 14 mutating operations with no state check
- 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
- 100Tools and files. Tools declared in frontmatter
- 100Steps. 44 steps
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 3418 tokens
- low 13 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +2Single-language instructions
- +3Description length 162: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 27 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 44 items
- +3Output format is stated explicitly
- +4Has examples (13 code blocks)
- +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (5 of 6)
- +1License stated
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 92.