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Persistent authenticated browser for OpenClaw via kasmweb/chrome Docker sidecar. Principal logs in once via noVNC — sessions saved permanently in Docker volume. Agent navigates any website, clicks, fills forms, extracts data, uploads files, takes screenshots, solves CAPTCHAs autonomously, and analyses pages with Claude Vision. Use when the task requires a real authenticated browser, not a static fetch.

LeoYeAI/openclaw-master-skills Agent Skills author: LeoYeAI MIT 5 files body ≈ 4 457 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 2 d ago

Persistent authenticated browser for OpenClaw via kasmweb/chrome Docker sidecar.

As a process D 49/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

IntegrationDockerTelegramPlaywrightCloudflareInfrastructureAI and agentsSoftware developmenttype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
A
92/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
99
Quality 40%
81
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
49/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
When it triggers w 12
20
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 1

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 1
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege browser_control.py:97
      Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (detector / deny-list definition; string literal in code, not executed)
      args=["--no-sandbox", "--disable-setuid-sandbox", "--disable-dev-shm-usage"]
      detectorcode literal

    Files scanned: 5. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "homepage"

    Process rating: all ten parameters 49/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 30Running it twice. 2 mutating operations with no state check
    • 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (web) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 4457 tokens
    • 100Steps. 17 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
    • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
    • low 20 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • -2localhost URLs: will not work for another user
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 405: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 21 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 17 items
    • +4Has examples (16 code blocks)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 81.