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CB youtube-video-editor-download

The youtube-video-editor-download skill lets you pull YouTube videos directly into an AI-driven editing session, trim clips, cut segments, merge sequences, and export finished files without juggling separate tools. Describe your edits in plain language — cut the intro, speed up section two, drop the last 30 seconds — and the skill executes them precisely. Output formats include mp4, mov, avi, webm, and mkv.

Not recommendedcritical or high security findings
LeoYeAI/openclaw-master-skills Agent Skills author: LeoYeAI MIT 2 files body ≈ 3 995 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 2 d ago

The youtube-video-editor-download skill lets you pull YouTube videos directly into an AI-driven editing session, trim clips, cut segments, merge sequences…

As a process B 70/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: inputs and preconditions, running it twice

ProcedureYouTubeMedia and videotype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
C
68/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
65
Quality 40%
72
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
70/100
Nearly there
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Running it twice w 4
30
Tools and files w 18
60
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Concealment
If you install

The skill tells the agent to hide things from you: not to show errors, not to mention actions, to report differently from what was done. You lose the ability to see what the agent really did.

For the author

Transparency beats a smooth answer. If the goal is to hide technical noise, ask the agent to "summarise briefly", not to "not mention".

Exfiltration medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

How to improve

  1. Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
  2. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 6

  • high Concealment en-hide-from-user SKILL.md:146
    Instruction to hide actions from the user
    Approximately 30% of editing operations complete without returning any text in the SSE stream. When no text content is received within the expected window: (1) poll the session state endpoint to confi
Medium and low: 5
  • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use SKILL.md:90
    Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
    $API = `${NEMO_API_URL:-https://mega-api-prod.nemovideo.ai}`, $TOKEN = `${NEMO_TOKEN}`, $WEB = `${NEMO_WEB_URL:-https://nemovideo.com}`.
  • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use SKILL.md:164
    Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
    curl -s "https://mega-api-prod.nemovideo.ai/api/credits/balance/simple" -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
  • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use SKILL.md:172
    Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
    curl -s "https://mega-api-prod.nemovideo.ai/api/state/nemo_agent/me/<sid>/latest" -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
  • low Exfiltration net-credential-use SKILL.md:152
    Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    **File upload**: `curl -s -X POST "https://mega-api-prod.nemovideo.ai/api/upload-video/nemo_agent/me/<sid>" -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" -H "X-Skill-Source: $SKILL_NAME" -H "X-Skill-Version: $SKI
    quoted
  • low Exfiltration net-credential-use SKILL.md:154
    Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    **URL upload**: `curl -s -X POST "https://mega-api-prod.nemovideo.ai/api/upload-video/nemo_agent/me/<sid>" -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" -H "Content-Type: application/json" -H "X-Skill-Source: $SK
    quoted

Files scanned: 2. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "displayName"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "homepage"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "apiDomain"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "repository"

Process rating: all ten parameters 70/100

  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 30Running it twice. 14 mutating operations with no state check
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (web) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
  • 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
  • 100Steps. 15 steps
  • 100Failures and branches. 1 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 3995 tokens
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
  • low The response is described with custom markup (5 tags): a typed call is more reliable

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 410: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 20 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 15 items
  • +3Output format is stated explicitly
  • +4Has examples (8 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 72.