BB doca-aes-gcm
Use this skill when the user is doing hands-on DOCA AES-GCM work on a BlueField DPU or ConnectX NIC — configuring `doca_aes_gcm_task_encrypt` / `_task_decrypt`, querying `doca_aes_gcm_cap_*` for per-key-type (only `DOCA_AES_GCM_KEY_128` / `_256` — AES-192 not supported) and per-task support, sizing plaintext against the max-buf cap, setting source / destination mmap permissions, validating with a NIST GCMVS or RFC 5288 vector, or debugging DOCA_ERROR_* including the security-critical tag-verification-failed outcome on decrypt. Trigger even when the user does not explicitly mention "DOCA AES-GCM" or "AEAD" — typical implicit phrasings: "decrypt completion IO_FAILED", "auth tag isn't verifying", "NOT_PERMITTED on my encrypt buffer", "is AES-192-GCM on this BlueField" (no), or "encrypted record came back tampered". Refuse and route elsewhere for non-GCM AES modes (CBC / CTR / XTS — CPU OpenSSL), key management (KMS / HSM / rotation), SHA (doca-sha), or general AEAD background.
Use this skill when the user is doing hands-on DOCA AES-GCM work on a BlueField DPU or ConnectX NIC — configuring docaaesgcmtaskencrypt / taskdecrypt…
As a process B 72/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, running it twice
How to improve
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 1
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 1
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityBENCHMARK.md:114Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)- **MEDIUM** SECURITY/Sudo/Root Execution (PE2): Privilege Escalation: Sudo (`BENC…:88`)
detector
Files scanned: 6. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec
Process rating: all ten parameters 72/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 30Running it twice. 4 mutating operations with no state check
- 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
- 100Steps. 38 steps
- 100When it triggers. States when to use and when not to
- 100Failures and branches. 4 branches, has a failure section
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 3776 tokens
- 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
- medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
- low 11 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
- low No test case covers injection arriving through data
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Description length 988: 120–800 characters recommended
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- +2Single-language instructions
- +5Description quotes 6 example trigger phrases
- +4Structure: 12 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 38 items
- +4Has examples (0 code blocks)
- +1License stated
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 87.