BB db-dump-cf
Выгрузка конфигурации 1С в CF-файл. Используй когда нужно выгрузить конфигурацию в CF, сохранить конфигурацию, сделать бэкап CF
Выгрузка конфигурации 1С в CF-файл.
As a process B 65/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, progress reporting
What is at stake
Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The files contain invisible characters, encoded commands or comments hidden from readers but visible to the model. What you read differs from what the agent sees.
Remove invisible characters (they usually sneak in through copy-paste) and encoded strings: no catalog will pass them. Instructions for the model must be readable by a human too.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.
Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.
How to improve
- Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 2
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 2
-
medium Obfuscation
uni-mixed-script-wordscripts/db-dump-cf.py:357Word mixing Latin and Cyrillic letters (homoglyph obfuscation) (1 occurrence)return a[:i] + a[i + 1:-1] # /N"имя" -> /Nимя
-
medium Broad scope
meta-broad-allowed-toolsSKILL.md:1Broad tool permissions pre-approved: Bashallowed-tools: Bash Read Glob AskUserQuestion
Files scanned: 3. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- warning
description-no-whendescription does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
Process rating: all ten parameters 65/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 60Failures and branches. 2 branches
- 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
- 100Tools and files. Tools declared in frontmatter
- 100Steps. 4 steps
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 793 tokens
- 100Running it twice. No mutating operations
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- -31 of 2 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
- +1No license
- +3Description length 127: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 6 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 4 items
- +4Has examples (3 code blocks)
- +2Bilingual instructions (RU + EN)
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 71.