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BC pinggy-tunnel

Zero-install localhost tunnels over SSH via Pinggy.

NousResearch/hermes-agent Hermes author: NousResearch MIT 1 file body ≈ 3 302 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 2 d ago

Zero-install localhost tunnels over SSH via Pinggy.

As a process C 54/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, running it twice

ProcedureDiscordGitHubStripeCloudflareAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: Hermes Agent
JSON
Technical rating
B
88/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
94
Quality 40%
80
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
54/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
When it triggers w 12
20
Running it twice w 4
30
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Exfiltration medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 2

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 2
    • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use SKILL.md:268
      Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
      curl -s "$URL/api/tags" -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" | head
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process SKILL.md:206
      Starts a background / autostarted process
      nohup python /tmp/webhook-server.py >/tmp/webhook-server.log 2>&1 &

    Files scanned: 1. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 54/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 30Running it twice. 2 mutating operations with no state check
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web, python) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 60Failures and branches. 2 branches
    • 60Consistency. The Hermes dialect needs category and tags
    • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
    • 85Steps. 16 steps, 2 vague phrases
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 3302 tokens
    • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
    • low The response is described with custom markup (4 tags): a typed call is more reliable

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Description length 51: 120–800 characters recommended
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • -2localhost URLs: will not work for another user
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +4Structure: 19 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 16 items
    • +4Has examples (13 code blocks)
    • +1License stated

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 80.