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X/Twitter via xurl CLI: raw post search, posting, DM, media.

NousResearch/hermes-agent Hermes author: NousResearch MIT 1 file body ≈ 3 962 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 2 d ago

X/Twitter via xurl CLI: raw post search, posting, DM, media.

As a process B 69/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: when it triggers, running it twice

IntegrationDockerGitHubAI and agentsMedia and videotype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: Hermes Agent
JSON
Technical rating
B
85/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
95
Quality 40%
70
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
69/100
Nearly there
When it triggers w 12
20
Running it twice w 4
30
Tools and files w 18
60
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 1

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 1
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell-known-host SKILL.md:59
    Pipe-to-shell installer from a well-known host (still executes remote code)
    curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/xdevplatform/xurl/main/install.sh | bash

Files scanned: 1. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when neither description nor a "## When to Use" section says when to use the skill
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "prerequisites"

Process rating: all ten parameters 69/100

  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 10 mutating operations with no state check
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web, python) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
  • 60Consistency. The Hermes dialect needs category and tags
  • 85Steps. 49 steps, 1 vague phrases
  • 100Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
  • 100Failures and branches. 1 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 3962 tokens
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
  • low 15 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 60: 120–800 characters recommended
  • -2localhost URLs: will not work for another user
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 28 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 49 items
  • +3Output format is stated explicitly
  • +4Has examples (24 code blocks)
  • +1License stated

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 70.