AB devils-advocate
Argues the strongest honest case against a decision, plan, belief, hire, pricing move, strategy, or piece of work the user is leaning toward. Steelmans the other side, ranks at most three objections by consequence, runs a short pre-mortem, credits what the user got right, and ends with what would have to be true for their choice to work. Calibrated and collegial, never combative; says plainly when the position is strong. Use whenever the user says "play devil's advocate", "argue the other side", "poke holes in this", "what am I missing", "am I making a mistake", "talk me out of it", "stress-test this idea", "tell me why this is a bad idea", or asks for pushback on something they have mostly decided. Supports gentle, standard, and hard intensity. Not for interrogating requirements before a build (grill-the-brief) or staging a multi-persona debate (debate-simulator).
Argues the strongest honest case against a decision, plan, belief, hire, pricing move, strategy, or piece of work the user is leaning toward.
As a process B 74/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: inputs and preconditions, running it twice, progress reporting
How to improve
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 4
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 4
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/techniques.md:36Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)## 4. Red teaming
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/techniques.md:38Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)Red teaming is structured adversarial review: an independent group attacks a plan to find weaknesses before an adversary or reality does.
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/techniques.md:40Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)- Zenko, M. (2015). *Red Team: How to Succeed by Thinking Like the Enemy*. Basic Books.
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/techniques.md:42Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)- UK Ministry of Defence, Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (2021). *Red Teaming Handbook*, 3rd edition.
Files scanned: 2. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec
Process rating: all ten parameters 74/100
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 30Running it twice. 3 mutating operations with no state check
- 55Failures and branches. 1 branches
- 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
- 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
- 100Steps. 18 steps
- 100When it triggers. States when to use and when not to
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1756 tokens
- low No test case covers injection arriving through data
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +3Description length 877: 120–800 characters recommended
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +5Description quotes 8 example trigger phrases
- +4Description says when NOT to use the skill
- +4Structure: 8 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 18 items
- +3Output format is stated explicitly
- +4Has examples (1 code blocks)
- +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (1 of 1)
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 97.