BC authorization-bypass-detection
Detect privilege escalation and unauthorized access via dialogue. Use when the agent has roles, admin functions, or multi-user data.
Detect privilege escalation and unauthorized access via dialogue.
As a process C 60/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: inputs and preconditions, failures and branches, running it twice
How to improve
For the model run — optional
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 5
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 5
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:3Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)description: Detect privilege escalation and unauthorized access via dialogue. Use when the agent has roles, admin functions, or multi-user data.
detector -
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:9Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)Detect **privilege escalation and unauthorized access** by probing whether the agent grants access or performs actions beyond the caller’s intended authority.
detector -
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:29Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)### 2. Privilege escalation
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:53Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)- Effective privilege escalation or auth bypass
-
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:59Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)For each **confirmed** finding, emit one `<vuln>`. Use a short descriptive `risk_type` (e.g. Unauthorized Access, Privilege Escalation). Do not use ASI or other framework codes—the reviewer stage adds
Files scanned: 1. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec
Process rating: all ten parameters 60/100
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 30Running it twice. 1 mutating operations with no state check
- 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
- 85Steps. 15 steps, 1 vague phrases
- 100Tools and files. Tools declared in frontmatter
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 699 tokens
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +3Description length 132: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 8 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 15 items
- +3Output format is stated explicitly
- +4Has examples (1 code blocks)
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 87.