BC codex
Run, configure, and troubleshoot OpenAI Codex CLI in non-interactive headless environments. Use for Codex automation in Bash or PowerShell, native Windows or WSL2, shell scripts, CI/CD, Docker, Kubernetes, remote servers, agent harnesses, or batch jobs; for constructing `codex exec` commands; selecting sandbox and approval modes; consuming JSONL events or structured output; resuming sessions; passing prompts through stdin; and handling failures caused by unavailable interactive input such as `request_user_input`.
Run, configure, and troubleshoot OpenAI Codex CLI in non-interactive headless environments.
As a process C 55/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, progress reporting
What is at stake
Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.
Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.
How to improve
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 3
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 3
-
medium Dangerous commands
cmd-pipe-to-shellreferences/windows.md:303Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (documentation of a security skill)curl -fsSL https://chatgpt.com/codex/install.sh | sh
security skill -
low Dangerous commands
cmd-execpolicy-bypassreferences/windows.md:37Runs PowerShell with execution policy bypassed (documentation of a security skill)powershell -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -Command "irm https://chatgpt.com/codex/install.ps1 | iex"
security skill
A further 1 matches are quotations in this security skill's documentation and are not counted as findings.
Files scanned: 4. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec
Process rating: all ten parameters 55/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
- 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash) that frontmatter does not declare
- 100Steps. 56 steps
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2545 tokens
- 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
- low 13 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +3Description length 518: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 20 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 56 items
- +4Has examples (19 code blocks)
- +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (2 of 2)
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 88.