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BC security-scan

Scan your Claude Code configuration (.claude/ directory) for security vulnerabilities, misconfigurations, and injection risks using AgentShield. Checks CLAUDE.md, settings.json, MCP servers, hooks, and agent definitions. Use when auditing a .claude/ directory — CLAUDE.md, settings.json, MCP servers, hooks, or agent definitions.

affaan-m/ECC Agent Skills author: affaan-m MIT 1 file body ≈ 1 046 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 2 h ago

Scan your Claude Code configuration (.claude/ directory) for security vulnerabilities, misconfigurations, and injection risks using AgentShield. Checks…

As a process C 57/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: when it triggers, failures and branches, running it twice

AnalyzerGitHubAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) OpenClaw Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
94/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
99
Quality 40%
87
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
57/100
Has gaps
Failures and branches w 10
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
When it triggers w 12
20
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten
This is a copy of a skill from another catalog; the rating counts the canonical one: security-scan (affaan-m/everything-claude-code)

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 1

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 1
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:102
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      1. **Attacker (Red Team)** — finds attack vectors

    Files scanned: 1. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 57/100

    • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 30Running it twice. 2 mutating operations with no state check
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
    • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
    • 85Steps. 28 steps, 1 vague phrases
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1046 tokens
    • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 329: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 18 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 28 items
    • +3Output format is stated explicitly
    • +4Has examples (7 code blocks)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 87.