SKILLEMALL.ai

CB stats

Show vault statistics and knowledge graph metrics. Provides a shareable snapshot of vault health, growth, and progress. Triggers on "/stats", "vault stats", "show metrics", "how big is my vault".

agenticnotetaking/arscontexta Claude Code author: agenticnotetaking MIT 2 files body ≈ 2 981 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 31 h ago

Show vault statistics and knowledge graph metrics.

As a process B 70/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, progress reporting

ProcedureData and analyticstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
C
87/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
95
Quality 40%
76
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
70/100
Nearly there
Result and completion w 14
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
30
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Broad scope medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.

For the author

Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 1

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 1
  • medium Broad scope meta-broad-allowed-tools SKILL.md:1
    Broad tool permissions pre-approved: Bash
    allowed-tools: Read Grep Glob Bash

Files scanned: 2. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "generated_from"

Process rating: all ten parameters 70/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 30Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
  • 85Steps. 17 steps, 3 vague phrases
  • 100Tools and files. Tools declared in frontmatter
  • 100Failures and branches. 1 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2981 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +5Description quotes 4 example trigger phrases
  • +3Description length 195: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 21 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 17 items
  • +4Has examples (10 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 76.