SKILLEMALL.ai

AC vendor-management

Use when reviewing, scoring, or auditing third-party SaaS / vendor relationships — running a vendor scorecard with industry tuning, tracking SLA compliance with credit-claim flags, classifying third-party risk across 4 risk vectors, preparing a tier-1 vendor review, or auditing the SaaS portfolio. Forks context so large vendor catalogs (50-500 line items) and SLA logs don't pollute the parent thread. Triggers on "vendor SLA", "vendor scorecard", "third-party risk", "TPRM", "vendor review", "supplier performance", "vendor health check", "renewal review".

alirezarezvani/claude-skills Agent Skills author: alirezarezvani MIT 8 files body ≈ 2 584 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com analyzed 2 d ago

Use when reviewing, scoring, or auditing third-party SaaS / vendor relationships — running a vendor scorecard with industry tuning, tracking SLA compliance…

As a process C 50/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, failures and branches

AnalyzerOperations and projectstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
A
98/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
99
Quality 40%
96
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
50/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 1

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 1
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/vendor_risk_anti_patterns.md:48
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      - **No third-party penetration testing of the cloud config.** A reasonably scoped TPRM-driven pen test would have caught the SSRF.

    Files scanned: 8. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "compatible_tools"

    Process rating: all ten parameters 50/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
    • 85Steps. 55 steps, 1 vague phrases
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2584 tokens
    • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations
    • low 11 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +5Description quotes 7 example trigger phrases
    • +3Description length 559: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 17 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 55 items
    • +4Has examples (1 code blocks)
    • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (3 of 3)
    • +3All 3 scripts are documented
    • +1License stated

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 96.