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BF ai-security

Use when assessing AI/ML systems for prompt injection, jailbreak vulnerabilities, model inversion risk, data poisoning exposure, or agent tool abuse. Covers MITRE ATLAS technique mapping, injection signature detection, and adversarial robustness scoring.

alirezarezvani/claude-skills Agent Skills author: alirezarezvani MIT 3 files body ≈ 4 395 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 3 d ago

Covers MITRE ATLAS technique mapping, injection signature detection, and adversarial robustness scoring.

As a process F 47/100 · Will not run — References files that are not bundled: ../threat-detection/SKILL.md, ../incident-response/SKILL.md, ../cloud-security/SKILL.md

AnalyzerAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) OpenClaw Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
86/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
88
Quality 40%
82
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
F
47/100
Will not run
References files that are not bundled: ../threat-detection/SKILL.md, ../incident-response/SKILL.md, ../cloud-security/SKILL.md
Tools and files w 18
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
When it triggers w 12
20
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

  1. The text references files that are not there: add them or drop the references.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 12

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 12
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/atlas-coverage.md:68
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    2. Jailbreak template database with regular updates from red team findings
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:213
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    | Privilege escalation via tools | Agent uses tools to access resources outside scope | AML.T0051 | Resource access scope monitoring |
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:348
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)
    2. **Treating static signature matching as complete** — Injection signature matching catches known patterns. Novel injection techniques that don't match existing signatures will not be detected. Compl
    detector

A further 9 matches are quotations in this security skill's documentation and are not counted as findings.

Files scanned: 3. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning missing-ref reference to a missing file: ../threat-detection/SKILL.md
  • warning missing-ref reference to a missing file: ../incident-response/SKILL.md
  • warning missing-ref reference to a missing file: ../cloud-security/SKILL.md
  • warning missing-ref reference to a missing file: ../security-pen-testing/SKILL.md

Process rating: all ten parameters 47/100

Will not run. References files that are not bundled: ../threat-detection/SKILL.md, ../incident-response/SKILL.md, ../cloud-security/SKILL.md
  • 0Tools and files. 4 referenced file(s) missing: ../threat-detection/SKILL.md, ../incident-response/SKILL.md, ../cloud-security/SKILL.md
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 13 mutating operations with no state check
  • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
  • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
  • 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 4395 tokens
  • 85Steps. 57 steps, 1 vague phrases
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
  • low 13 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 254: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 37 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 57 items
  • +3Output format is stated explicitly
  • +4Has examples (5 code blocks)
  • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (1 of 1)
  • +3All 1 scripts are documented

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 82.