BF red-team
Use when planning or executing authorized red team engagements, attack path analysis, or offensive security simulations. Covers MITRE ATT&CK kill-chain planning, technique scoring, choke point identification, OPSEC risk assessment, and crown jewel targeting.
Covers MITRE ATT&CK kill-chain planning, technique scoring, choke point identification, OPSEC risk assessment, and crown jewel targeting.
As a process F 46/100 · Will not run — References files that are not bundled: ../threat-detection/SKILL.md, ../incident-response/SKILL.md, ../cloud-security/SKILL.md
AnalyzerResearchSoftware developmentOperations and projectstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
How to improve
- The text references files that are not there: add them or drop the references.
For the model run — optional
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 10
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 10
-
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/attack-path-methodology.md:3Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)Reference documentation for attack path graph construction, choke point scoring, and effort-vs-impact analysis used in red team engagement planning.
detector -
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/attack-path-methodology.md:60Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)| T1486 Ransomware | 0.90 | 3 | 3.60 | impact |
-
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/attack-path-methodology.md:81Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)- T1003 (Credential Access) — required for Pass-the-Hash and most lateral movement
-
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/attack-path-methodology.md:82Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)- T1558 (Kerberos Tickets) — Kerberoasting provides service account credentials for privilege escalation
-
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/attack-path-methodology.md:85Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)- iam:PassRole — required for most cloud privilege escalation paths
-
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:3Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)description: "Use when planning or executing authorized red team engagements, attack path analysis, or offensive security simulations. Covers MITRE ATT&CK kill-chain planning, technique scoring, choke
quoted -
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:6Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)# Red Team
-
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:8Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)Red team engagement planning and attack path analysis skill for authorized offensive security simulations. This is NOT vulnerability scanning (see security-pen-testing) or incident response (see incid
-
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:32Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)This skill provides the methodology and tooling for **red team engagement planning** — building structured attack plans from MITRE ATT&CK technique selection, access level, and crown jewel targets. It
-
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:45Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)**All red team activities described here require written authorization.** This includes a signed Rules of Engagement (RoE) document, defined scope, and explicit executive approval. The `engagement_pla
Files scanned: 3. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- warning
missing-refreference to a missing file: ../threat-detection/SKILL.md - warning
missing-refreference to a missing file: ../incident-response/SKILL.md - warning
missing-refreference to a missing file: ../cloud-security/SKILL.md - warning
missing-refreference to a missing file: ../security-pen-testing/SKILL.md
Process rating: all ten parameters 46/100
Will not run. References files that are not bundled: ../threat-detection/SKILL.md, ../incident-response/SKILL.md, ../cloud-security/SKILL.md
- 0Tools and files. 4 referenced file(s) missing: ../threat-detection/SKILL.md, ../incident-response/SKILL.md, ../cloud-security/SKILL.md
- 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
- 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 30Running it twice. 5 mutating operations with no state check
- 40Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
- 85Steps. 42 steps, 3 vague phrases
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 3868 tokens
- 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
- low 12 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +3Description length 258: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 32 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 42 items
- +4Has examples (5 code blocks)
- +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (1 of 1)
- +3All 1 scripts are documented
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 79.