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BD senior-secops

Use for application security operations: security reviews, CVE remediation, hardening, secrets and auth, or SOC 2, PCI-DSS, HIPAA and GDPR checks. Scans with security_scanner.py, assesses CVEs with vulnerability_assessor.py and checks controls with compliance_checker.py.

alirezarezvani/claude-skills Agent Skills author: alirezarezvani MIT 7 files · 3 scripts body ≈ 3 906 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 15 h ago

Use for application security operations: security reviews, CVE remediation, hardening, secrets and auth, or SOC 2, PCI-DSS, HIPAA and GDPR checks.

As a process D 48/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ProcedureGitHubSecuritytype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) OpenClaw Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
93/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
95
Quality 40%
91
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
48/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 5

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 5
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/compliance_requirements.md:59
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      - [ ] Penetration testing (annual)
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-eval-dynamic references/security_standards.md:142
      Dynamic code execution from decoded/untrusted input (documentation of a security skill)
      # NEVER use: os.system(f"ping {user_input}")
      security skill
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:329
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      - **Req 10/11**: Audit logging, SAST/DAST/penetration testing
    • low Secrets in code secret-password-literal SKILL.md:349
      Hard-coded password / key literal (may be an example) (placeholder value)
      API_KEY = "sk-1…def"
      placeholder
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:422
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      | A01 | Broken Access Control | Verify role checks on every endpoint; test horizontal privilege escalation; block SSRF to internal and metadata endpoints (169.254.169.254) |

    Files scanned: 7. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 48/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 30Running it twice. 8 mutating operations with no state check
    • 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, python) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 100Steps. 39 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 3906 tokens
    • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
    • low 11 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 271: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 32 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 39 items
    • +4Has examples (19 code blocks)
    • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (3 of 3)
    • +3All 3 scripts are documented

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 91.