BC senior-security
Use when the user asks for STRIDE threat modeling, DREAD risk scoring, data-flow-diagram threat analysis, or a quick secret scan — or when a security request needs routing to the right specialist skill (pen-testing, incident response, cloud posture, red team, AI security, threat hunting, secure code review). This skill owns threat modeling; everything else routes to a sibling.
Use when the user asks for STRIDE threat modeling, DREAD risk scoring, data-flow-diagram threat analysis, or a quick secret scan — or when a security request…
As a process C 63/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, progress reporting
What is at stake
Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The files contain someone else's key or token. If it is live, your agent will call third-party services under a stranger's identity; if it was revoked, the skill's scripts simply fail. Such a key often arrives with the author's whole workspace, personal data included.
The key is visible to everyone who downloaded the skill and has likely been copied by catalog-scanning bots already. Revoke it now, check bills and access logs, then reissue.
How to improve
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 11
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 11
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medium Secrets in code
secret-private-keyscripts/secret_scanner.py:165Private key material (detector / deny-list definition; key header without key body)regex=r'-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY----- …
detectorheader only -
medium Secrets in code
secret-private-keyscripts/secret_scanner.py:174Private key material (detector / deny-list definition; key header without key body)regex=r'-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY----- …
detectorheader only -
medium Secrets in code
secret-private-keyscripts/secret_scanner.py:183Private key material (detector / deny-list definition; key header without key body)regex=r'-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY----- …
detectorheader only -
medium Secrets in code
secret-private-keyscripts/secret_scanner.py:192Private key material (detector / deny-list definition; key header without key body)regex=r'-----BEGIN PGP PRIVATE KEY BLOCK-----',
detectorheader only -
low Secrets in code
secret-password-literalreferences/cryptography-implementation.md:453Hard-coded password / key literal (may be an example)password = "user…123!"
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low Secrets in code
secret-password-literalreferences/security-architecture-patterns.md:347Hard-coded password / key literal (may be an example)password: constr(min_length=12, max_length=128)
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low Secrets in code
secret-password-literalreferences/security-architecture-patterns.md:583Hard-coded password / key literal (may be an example) (placeholder value)API_KEY = "sk-1…def"
placeholder -
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/threat-modeling-guide.md:221Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)- KeyLog: Keylogger
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/threat-modeling-guide.md:237Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)| JWT forgery → Privilege escalation | High | Low | Critical |
detector -
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/threat-modeling-guide.md:469Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)| A01 | Broken Access Control | E | IDOR, privilege escalation |
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:3Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)description: Use when the user asks for STRIDE threat modeling, DREAD risk scoring, data-flow-diagram threat analysis, or a quick secret scan — or when a security request needs routing to the right sp
Files scanned: 6. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec
Process rating: all ten parameters 63/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 55Failures and branches. 1 branches
- 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
- 85Steps. 5 steps, 1 vague phrases
- 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1181 tokens
- 100Running it twice. No mutating operations
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +3Description length 379: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 6 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 5 items
- +4Has examples (2 code blocks)
- +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (3 of 3)
- +3All 2 scripts are documented
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 91.