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alirezarezvani/claude-skills Agent Skills author: alirezarezvani MIT 5 files body ≈ 3 111 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 27 h ago

Atlassian Administrator for managing and organizing Atlassian products (Jira, Confluence, Bitbucket, Trello), users, permissions, security, integrations…

As a process C 58/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

IntegrationConfluenceJiraTrelloOperations and projectsData and analyticsCommercetype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) OpenClaw Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
89/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
99
Quality 40%
73
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
58/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
When it triggers w 12
20
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 1

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 1
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:81
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      2. Review vendor security documentation (penetration test reports, SOC 2)

    Files scanned: 5. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 58/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 30Running it twice. 15 mutating operations with no state check
    • 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
    • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
    • 100Steps. 120 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 3111 tokens
    • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
    • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • +4No input/output examples
    • -42 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
    • -31 of 1 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 460: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 24 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 120 items

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 73.