SKILLEMALL.ai

CB duffel

Use Duffel to search, book, pay for, or manage flights. Use Duffel to monitor an already booked flight's fare when the user directly asks for ongoing price monitoring.

asgeirtj/system_prompts_leaks Agent Skills author: asgeirtj CC0-1.0 3 files body ≈ 7 033 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 6 d ago

Use Duffel to search, book, pay for, or manage flights.

As a process B 70/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, running it twice

ProcedureInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
C
87/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
95
Quality 40%
74
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
70/100
Nearly there
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Running it twice w 4
30
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Concealment medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill tells the agent to hide things from you: not to show errors, not to mention actions, to report differently from what was done. You lose the ability to see what the agent really did.

For the author

Transparency beats a smooth answer. If the goal is to hide technical noise, ask the agent to "summarise briefly", not to "not mention".

How to improve

  1. The SKILL.md body is over 5,000 tokens: move reference detail into references/ and load it when needed.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 1

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 1
  • medium Concealment en-hide-from-user SKILL.md:320
    Instruction to hide actions from the user (detector / deny-list definition)
    itinerary signature, total, currency, and check time. Do not notify the user
    detector

Files scanned: 3. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning body-long SKILL.md body ≈ 7033 tokens (recommended < 5000); move details to references/

Process rating: all ten parameters 70/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 30Running it twice. 30 mutating operations with no state check
  • 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 7033 tokens
  • 100Tools and files. Tools declared in frontmatter
  • 100Steps. 19 steps
  • 100When it triggers. States when to use and when not to
  • 100Failures and branches. 2 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
  • low 10 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
  • high The skill tells the model to perform an irreversible action with no human approval
  • low The response is described with custom markup (8 tags): a typed call is more reliable

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 167: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 11 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 19 items
  • +4Has examples (10 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 74.