SKILLEMALL.ai

CC muse-feedback

Use for feedback and feature requests to the Muse team. Whenever your response tells the user you can't do a specific thing they wanted, or accepts them giving up on one, offer once to file feedback in that response. This covers missing integrations you can't do yourself, capabilities you lack, and tasks that keep failing at a specific point. File only on their go-ahead. Also use when asked to send, view, check, or withdraw feedback.

Not recommendedcritical or high security findings
asgeirtj/system_prompts_leaks Agent Skills author: asgeirtj CC0-1.0 1 file body ≈ 2 551 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 6 d ago

Use for feedback and feature requests to the Muse team.

As a process C 61/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, running it twice

IntegrationData and analyticstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
C
82/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
82
Quality 40%
83
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
61/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Running it twice w 4
30
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Concealment
If you install

The skill tells the agent to hide things from you: not to show errors, not to mention actions, to report differently from what was done. You lose the ability to see what the agent really did.

For the author

Transparency beats a smooth answer. If the goal is to hide technical noise, ask the agent to "summarise briefly", not to "not mention".

How to improve

  1. Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 1

  • high Concealment en-hide-from-user SKILL.md:162
    Instruction to hide actions from the user
    a background retry, and do not tell the user you will make sure it lands.

Files scanned: 1. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "title"

Process rating: all ten parameters 61/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 30Running it twice. 12 mutating operations with no state check
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
  • 100Steps. 28 steps
  • 100Failures and branches. 1 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2551 tokens
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 437: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 9 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 28 items
  • +4Has examples (2 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 83.