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AB cloud-security

Cloud posture security across AWS, Azure, and GCP — IAM least privilege, public exposure, encryption, logging coverage, landing-zone guardrails. Use when auditing a cloud account, before a production launch, or after a scan.

borghei/Claude-Skills Agent Skills author: borghei 11 files · 4 scripts body ≈ 3 939 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 8 h ago

Cloud posture security across AWS, Azure, and GCP — IAM least privilege, public exposure, encryption, logging coverage, landing-zone guardrails.

As a process B 69/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: result and completion, running it twice

AnalyzerAWSGoogle CloudAzureInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) OpenClaw Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
A
96/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
98
Quality 40%
92
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
69/100
Nearly there
Result and completion w 14
0
Running it twice w 4
30
When it triggers w 12
50
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 2

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 2
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/cloud-control-catalog.md:121
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      | Backup copies outside the primary account | Required for anything tier-1; ransomware deletes in-account backups first |
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:223
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      - The output is a configuration review. It is not a penetration test, a compliance attestation or proof that no breach occurred.

    Files scanned: 11. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 69/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 30Running it twice. 4 mutating operations with no state check
    • 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 55Failures and branches. 1 branches
    • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
    • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
    • 100Steps. 42 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 3939 tokens
    • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 224: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 20 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 42 items
    • +4Has examples (3 code blocks)
    • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (2 of 2)
    • +3All 4 scripts are documented
    • +1License stated

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 92.