BB red-team
This skill should be used when the user asks to "plan a red team engagement", "scope a penetration test", "design a security assessment methodology", "create rules of engagement", or "plan an adversary simulation".
This skill should be used when the user asks to "plan a red team engagement", "scope a penetration test", "design a security assessment methodology", "create…
As a process B 66/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, progress reporting
How to improve
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 10
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 10
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/red-team-methodology.md:1Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)# Red Team Methodology Reference
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/red-team-methodology.md:15Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)| Privilege Escalation | Gaining higher permissions | Exploit vulnerability, token manipulation |
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/red-team-methodology.md:17Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)| Credential Access | Stealing credentials | Brute force, credential dumping, keylogging |
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/red-team-methodology.md:19Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)| Lateral Movement | Moving through network | Remote services, pass-the-hash |
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/red-team-methodology.md:39Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)### PTES (Penetration Testing Execution Standard)
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:4Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)This skill should be used when the user asks to "plan a red team engagement",
quoted -
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:5Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)"scope a penetration test", "design a security assessment methodology",
quoted -
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:17Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)# Red Team
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:20Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)> **Domain:** Offensive Security
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:24Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)The **Red Team** skill provides tools for planning and scoping security engagements. It helps define rules of engagement, select methodologies, scope targets, plan attack phases, and generate engageme
Files scanned: 3. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec
Process rating: all ten parameters 66/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 55Failures and branches. 1 branches
- 85Steps. 38 steps, 1 vague phrases
- 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
- 100When it triggers. States when to use and when not to
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1280 tokens
- 100Running it twice. No mutating operations
- medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- +2Single-language instructions
- +5Description quotes 5 example trigger phrases
- +3Description length 214: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 13 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 38 items
- +4Has examples (1 code blocks)
- +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (1 of 1)
- +3All 1 scripts are documented
- +1License stated
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 97.