BC vendor-due-diligence
Assess IT vendors and third-party partners with multi-factor risk scoring and regulatory compliance checklists. Use when evaluating technology vendors.
Assess IT vendors and third-party partners with multi-factor risk scoring and regulatory compliance checklists.
As a process C 62/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions
How to improve
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 4
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 4
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/monitoring_framework.md:231Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)| Annual penetration testing | Moderate+ security risk | Contractual requirement; share results |
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/regulatory_checklists.md:56Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)| 3 | Digital operational resilience testing | Does vendor participate in or conduct threat-led penetration testing (TLPT)? | TLPT reports; testing schedule |
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/risk_assessment_framework.md:112Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)| 1 | SOC 2 Type II + ISO 27001; zero-trust architecture; quarterly pen testing; bug bounty program; SIEM/SOC; encryption everywhere; MFA enforced; mature vulnerability management |
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/risk_assessment_framework.md:123Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)| Penetration testing | Pen test executive summary | No pen test in last 12 months; critical findings open |
Files scanned: 6. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec
Process rating: all ten parameters 62/100
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 40Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash) that frontmatter does not declare
- 100Steps. 53 steps
- 100Failures and branches. 1 branches, has a failure section
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 3088 tokens
- 100Running it twice. No mutating operations
- low 11 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- +2Single-language instructions
- +3Description length 151: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 19 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 53 items
- +4Has examples (4 code blocks)
- +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (3 of 3)
- +3All 2 scripts are documented
- +1License stated
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 92.