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BB information-security-manager-iso27001

ISO 27001:2022 ISMS implementation and cybersecurity governance for HealthTech and MedTech. Use for ISMS design, risk assessment per Clause 6.1.2, Annex A controls, ISO 27001 certification, security audits, and incident response.

borghei/Claude-Skills Agent Skills author: borghei 9 files · 2 scripts body ≈ 1 836 tokens Open the sourcegithub.com↗ analyzed 8 h ago

ISO 27001:2022 ISMS implementation and cybersecurity governance for HealthTech and MedTech.

As a process B 68/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, progress reporting

AnalyzerAWSGoogle CloudAzureInfrastructureSecurityData and analyticstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) OpenClaw Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
91/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
91
Quality 40%
92
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
68/100
Nearly there
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
Result and completion w 14
40
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 9

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 9
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/cloud-and-cross-framework.md:199
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      | Critical | Processes/stores sensitive data, system access | Annual on-site + continuous monitoring | Full security audit, penetration test review |
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/incident-response.md:25
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)
      | Malware | Malicious software infection | Ransomware, virus, trojan |
      detector
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/incident-response.md:35
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      | **Critical (P1)** | Active breach, data loss, system down | Immediate (15 min) | Ransomware, confirmed breach |
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/incident-response.md:327
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      ### Ransomware Recovery
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/incident-response.md:330
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      - [ ] Identify ransomware variant
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/iso27001-controls.md:252
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      - Penetration test reports
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/risk-assessment-guide.md:79
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      | Ransomware | High | All systems | Financial |
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/risk-assessment-guide.md:131
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      2. **Penetration Testing:** Annual third-party tests
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:70
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      **Out of Scope:** ISO 27001 certification audit execution (preparation guidance only, not audit services); implementation of specific security tools (SIEM, EDR, DLP, WAF — mapped to categories only);

    Files scanned: 9. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 68/100

    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 40Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 55Failures and branches. 1 branches
    • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
    • 100Steps. 17 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1836 tokens
    • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 229: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 8 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 17 items
    • +4Has examples (1 code blocks)
    • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (6 of 6)
    • +3All 2 scripts are documented
    • +1License stated

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 92.