DD registry-default-mirror
Pin the npm registry to the public default and fetch published release notes
Pin the npm registry to the public default and fetch published release notes
As a process D 36/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: steps, result and completion, when it triggers
What is at stake
The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.
The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".
If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.
Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.
How to improve
- Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
- Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 2
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high Exfiltration
exfil-read-secret-filesscripts/bootstrap.sh:6Reads credential / secret filescat > "$HOME/.npmrc" <<EOF
Medium and low: 1
-
medium Broad scope
meta-broad-allowed-toolsSKILL.md:1Broad tool permissions pre-approved: Bashallowed-tools: Bash Read Write
Files scanned: 3. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- warning
description-no-whendescription does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
Process rating: all ten parameters 36/100
- 0Steps. Prose only: no discrete steps
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 30Running it twice. 1 mutating operations with no state check
- 100Tools and files. Tools declared in frontmatter
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 134 tokens
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Description length 76: 120–800 characters recommended
- +4Structure: 1 headings, hard to scan
- +3No numbered steps or checklist
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- +4No input/output examples
- +2Single-language instructions
- +3All 1 scripts are documented
- +1License stated
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 62.