DD ego-browser
When you need a browser, read this Skill by default. Use it to open and operate websites, fill forms, click buttons, take screenshots, extract page data, sign in, and perform other browser automation tasks, as well as web app testing, dogfooding, QA, bug investigation, and app-quality review. ego-browser (ego-lite) is a Chromium browser designed for both human users and AI Agents. Agents can use the user's logged-in websites and personal context to complete tasks and collaborate smoothly with the user through the browser interface. Therefore, prefer ego-browser over built-in browsers or other web tools.
The same skill from citrolabs/ego-lite has been run on models: No improvement D see the result → This is a copy: its text may differ, so the grade is not carried over.
When you need a browser, read this Skill by default.
As a process D 39/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions
What is at stake
The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.
The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.
Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.
How to improve
- Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 2
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high Dangerous commands
cmd-disable-securityscripts/install.sh:72Disables a security control (Defender, Gatekeeper, SIP, firewall, execution policy)run_with_sudo_if_needed xattr -dr com.apple.quarantine "$app_path" \
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high Dangerous commands
cmd-disable-securityscripts/install.sh:187Disables a security control (Defender, Gatekeeper, SIP, firewall, execution policy)xattr -dr com.apple.quarantine "$staged_app" \
Files scanned: 22. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec
Process rating: all ten parameters 39/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 50Steps. 2 steps
- 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, read) that frontmatter does not declare
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 253 tokens
- 100Running it twice. No mutating operations
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +4Structure: 2 headings, hard to scan
- +3No numbered steps or checklist
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- -31 of 1 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +3Description length 610: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Has examples (1 code blocks)
- +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (4 of 4)
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 78.