SKILLEMALL.ai

CC cis-openeuler-audit

审计 OpenEuler 系统与对应 RHEL CIS Benchmark 的合规差异,生成合规报告。

Not recommendedcritical or high security findings
ClawHub Agent Skills author: 0X008 v1.0.0 MIT-0 6 files · 1 script body ≈ 339 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 23 h ago

审计 OpenEuler 系统与对应 RHEL CIS Benchmark 的合规差异,生成合规报告。

As a process C 53/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

AnalyzerData and analyticsAI and agentsInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
C
65/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
57
Quality 40%
76
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
53/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Dangerous commands
If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

  1. Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
  2. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 9

  • high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence scripts/collect-baseline.sh:189
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
    cat /etc/crontab 2>/dev/null || echo "N/A"
  • high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence scripts/collect-baseline.sh:195
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
    cat /etc/cron.deny 2>/dev/null || echo "not present"
Medium and low: 7
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-persistence references/cis-rhel-benchmark-mapping.md:107
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (documentation table row; documentation of a security skill)
    | 2.1.2 | crontab 权限 | 600/700 | `stat /etc/crontab` | auto | 命令一致 |
    tablesecurity skill
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-persistence references/cis-rhel-benchmark-mapping.md:108
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (documentation table row; documentation of a security skill)
    | 2.1.3 | cron 小时目录权限 | 700 | `stat /etc/cron.hourly` | auto | 命令一致 |
    tablesecurity skill
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-persistence references/cis-rhel-benchmark-mapping.md:109
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (documentation table row; documentation of a security skill)
    | 2.1.4 | cron 每日目录权限 | 700 | `stat /etc/cron.daily` | auto | 命令一致 |
    tablesecurity skill
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-persistence references/cis-rhel-benchmark-mapping.md:110
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (documentation table row; documentation of a security skill)
    | 2.1.5 | cron 每周目录权限 | 700 | `stat /etc/cron.weekly` | auto | 命令一致 |
    tablesecurity skill
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-persistence references/cis-rhel-benchmark-mapping.md:112
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (documentation table row; documentation of a security skill)
    | 2.1.7 | cron.d 权限 | 700 | `stat /etc/cron.d` | auto | 命令一致 |
    tablesecurity skill
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-persistence scripts/collect-baseline.sh:188
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (detector / deny-list definition; string literal in code, not executed)
    echo "=== /etc/crontab ==="
    detectorcode literal

A further 1 matches are quotations in this security skill's documentation and are not counted as findings.

Files scanned: 6. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")

Process rating: all ten parameters 53/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
  • 100Steps. 12 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 339 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 51: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 7 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 12 items
  • +4Has examples (2 code blocks)
  • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (2 of 2)
  • +3All 2 scripts are documented

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 76.

External checks

ClawHub: clean
This is a legitimate OpenEuler CIS audit skill, but its generated baselines can contain sensitive local security configuration and should be protected.
LLM: benign (high) · VirusTotal: · 28 May 2026