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CC precog

Trade on prediction markets. Create a local wallet, list markets, check prices, buy and sell outcome shares. Coming soon: create and fund markets directly from this skill.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: 0xAstraea v0.1.4 MIT-0 19 files body ≈ 3 929 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 56/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, consistency

GeneratorInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
C
73/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
78
Quality 40%
66
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
56/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
When it triggers w 12
20
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Risky intent medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The purpose itself is risky: wallets, browser password stores, offensive security. Even an honest implementation gives the agent access to things that cost money.

For the author

Explain in the description why the access is needed and how it is limited; add tests that show refusals on dangerous requests.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 14

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 14
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets PRECOG.md:884
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    You hold the private key (and seed phrase) yourself. No third party can freeze or access your funds.
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets PRECOG.md:886
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    **Tradeoff:** If you lose your seed phrase, funds are unrecoverable. You are fully responsible for key security.
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:145
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…QYA+ISs0/2l3T9/kj42…aQT/dfNXWX/ZZCQ==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:349
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha512-6+gjmF…uh8+uw3mnrvgs+dSPQ…dZG+D4garKg==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:366
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…DUr+vOv8…A8A==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:437
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…p81+8Ob3…L40/b0i7…gQw==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:588
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…Q8E+t5Jh…rfX+bKrFe+Xp5Y…DAA==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package.json:27
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    "sepolia": { "chainId": 84532, "contract": "0x61…443" },
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token scripts/lib/client.mjs:24
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    address: "0x61…443",
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token SKILL.md:48
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (documentation table row)
    | Base Sepolia (testnet) | `sepolia` **← default** | Base Sepolia (84532) | `0x61…443` |
    table
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token SKILL.md:88
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential)
    Wallet: 0x77…9E1
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token SKILL.md:96
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential)
    Wallet: 0x77…9E1
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token SKILL.md:263
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential)
    👛  0x77…9E1
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token SKILL.md:367
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    - Collateral token (MATE address: `0xC1…EbD`)
    quoted

Files scanned: 19. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "homepage"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "env"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "requires"

Process rating: all ten parameters 56/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 10 mutating operations with no state check
  • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (precog) differs from the folder (opencog)
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
  • 100Steps. 37 steps
  • 100Failures and branches. 2 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 3929 tokens
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
  • low 14 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -5TODO / placeholder text left in the skill
  • -213 emoji in the instructions: noise for the model
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 171: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 16 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 37 items
  • +4Has examples (16 code blocks)
  • +3All 7 scripts are documented
  • +1License stated

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 66.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This is a real prediction-market trading skill, but it needs review because it stores a fund-controlling wallet key in plaintext and ships broader contract-control surfaces than its trading instructions disclose.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026