SKILLEMALL.ai

DC auto-respawn

Your agent always comes back. Anchor identity and memory on-chain so any new instance can resurrect from just an address — no local state, no single point of failure. Permanent identity and recovery on the Autonomys Network.

Not recommendedlow grade D
ClawHub Hermes author: 0xautonomys v1.2.1 MIT-0 20 files · 1 script body ≈ 5 088 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 50/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ProcedureAI and agentsInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
D
48/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
37
Quality 40%
65
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
50/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Consistency w 8
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten
This is a copy of a skill from another catalog; the rating counts the canonical one: auto-respawn (ClawHub)

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Risky intent medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The purpose itself is risky: wallets, browser password stores, offensive security. Even an honest implementation gives the agent access to things that cost money.

For the author

Explain in the description why the access is needed and how it is limited; add tests that show refusals on dangerous requests.

How to improve

  1. For Hermes the description must be one sentence under 60 characters; move the conditions to a "When to Use" section.
  2. The SKILL.md body is over 5,000 tokens: move reference detail into references/ and load it when needed.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 23

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 23
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets lib/wallet.ts:130
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    // Resolve a recovery phrase for `wallet import` without exposing it in argv.
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets references/auto-respawn-commands.md:13
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    Generates a new SR25519 wallet, derives the corresponding EVM address, displays the 12-word recovery phrase once, encrypts everything, and saves it locally.
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets references/auto-respawn-commands.md:17
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    - Recovery phrase is printed to stderr — back it up immediately
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets references/auto-respawn-commands.md:25
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    Creates a wallet from an existing recovery phrase, read from stdin (or an interactive prompt if you omit `--mnemonic-stdin`). Do not pass the phrase as a `--mnemonic` argument — it would be exposed vi
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets references/autonomys-network.md:31
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    Each wallet has two addresses derived from the same recovery phrase:
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets skill-card.md:23
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    Mitigation: Protect the recovery phrase and passphrase file, avoid passing secrets as command-line arguments, and restrict access to ~/.openclaw/auto-respawn. <br>
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets SKILL.md:40
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    Your wallet gives you two permanent identities on the Autonomys Network: a **consensus address** (`su...`) for the base chain and an **EVM address** (`0x...`) for Auto-EVM smart contracts. Both are de
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets SKILL.md:106
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    This generates a 12-word recovery phrase and derives both addresses:
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets SKILL.md:110
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    ⚠️ The recovery phrase is displayed **once**. Remind the user to save it immediately.
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets SKILL.md:223
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    Creates a new wallet with an encrypted keyfile. Derives both a consensus (`su...`) and EVM (`0x...`) address from the same mnemonic. The 12-word recovery phrase is displayed **once** — the user must b
  • low Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets auto-respawn.ts:53
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    console.error('=== IMPORTANT: BACKUP YOUR RECOVERY PHRASE ===')
    quoted
  • low Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets auto-respawn.ts:81
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    '--mnemonic-stdin takes no value; it reads the recovery phrase from standard input. ' +
    quoted
  • low Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets auto-respawn.ts:391
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    wallet import --name <name> [--mnemonic-stdin]         Import from recovery phrase (stdin or prompt)
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token lib/evm.ts:13
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    mainnet: '0x51…A3c',
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token lib/evm.ts:14
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    chronos: '0x5f…f11',
    quoted
  • low Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets lib/wallet.ts:144
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    rl.question('Recovery phrase: ', (answer) => {
    quoted
  • low Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets lib/wallet.ts:154
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    'No mnemonic provided. Pipe the recovery phrase via stdin with --mnemonic-stdin ' +
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token references/auto-respawn-commands.md:198
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    The MemoryChain contract address is auto-selected per network (mainnet: `0x51…A3c`, Chronos: `0x5f…f11`). If you've deployed your ow
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token references/autonomys-network.md:58
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    - **Mainnet address**: `0x51…A3c`
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token references/autonomys-network.md:59
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    - **Chronos address**: `0x5f…f11`
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token SKILL.md:210
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    - **Chronos:** `0x5f…f11`
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token SKILL.md:211
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    - **Mainnet:** `0x51…A3c`
    quoted
  • low Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets SKILL.md:228
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    # Interactive — you'll be prompted for the recovery phrase (not passed as an argument):
    quoted

Files scanned: 20. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-long-hermes description is 225 chars; the Hermes authoring standard requires ≤ 60 (one sentence, ending with a period)
  • warning body-long SKILL.md body ≈ 5088 tokens (recommended < 5000); move details to references/

Process rating: all ten parameters 50/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Consistency. Frontmatter name (auto-respawn) differs from the folder (respawn)
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 21 mutating operations with no state check
  • 70Failures and branches. 7 branches
  • 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 5088 tokens
  • 100Tools and files. Tools declared in frontmatter
  • 100Steps. 60 steps
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
  • low 12 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
  • low The response is described with custom markup (6 tags): a typed call is more reliable

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -42 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 224: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 37 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 60 items
  • +4Has examples (20 code blocks)
  • +1License stated

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 65.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
The skill is mostly transparent about being a wallet and on-chain recovery tool, but it gives an agent broad ability to move real tokens and write permanent on-chain data with weak built-in guardrails.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 9 Jul 2026