SKILLEMALL.ai
GitHub ↗ RU Sign in

DD celaut-bridge-skill

Bridge skill for the Celaut decentralised-compute network — install the Celaut node (nodo), package projects into content-addressed microVM services, execute and observe workloads, and discover on-chain "Unstoppable Skills" via the read-only MCP server (publishing is via the reputation-system TypeScript library).

Not recommendedlow grade D
ClawHub Agent Skills author: 0xf965 v1.2.0 MIT-0 13 files body ≈ 5 073 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 34 h ago

Bridge skill for the Celaut decentralised-compute network — install the Celaut node (nodo), package projects into content-addressed microVM services, execute…

As a process D 49/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, failures and branches, consistency

ProcedureGitHubDockerAI and agentsSoftware developmenttype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
D
46/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
36
Quality 40%
62
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
49/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
  2. The SKILL.md body is over 5,000 tokens: move reference detail into references/ and load it when needed.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 16

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 16
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege INSTALL.md:356
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
    sudo tee /usr/local/bin/nodo >/dev/null <<WRAP
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege INSTALL.md:365
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
    sudo chmod +x /usr/local/bin/nodo
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell-known-host SKILL.md:102
    Pipe-to-shell installer from a well-known host (still executes remote code)
    curl --proto '=https' --tlsv1.2 -sSf https://raw.githubusercontent.com/celaut-project/nodo/stable/install.sh | sudo bash
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege SKILL.md:102
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
    curl --proto '=https' --tlsv1.2 -sSf https://raw.githubusercontent.com/celaut-project/nodo/stable/install.sh | sudo bash
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege SKILL.md:113
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
    sudo bash /tmp/nodo-install.sh
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell-known-host SKILL.md:130
    Pipe-to-shell installer from a well-known host (still executes remote code)
    curl --proto '=https' --tlsv1.2 -sSf https://raw.githubusercontent.com/celaut-project/nodo/dev/install.sh | sudo bash -s -- --branch dev
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege SKILL.md:130
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
    curl --proto '=https' --tlsv1.2 -sSf https://raw.githubusercontent.com/celaut-project/nodo/dev/install.sh | sudo bash -s -- --branch dev
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege UNINSTALL.md:17
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
    sudo chmod +x uninstall.sh
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege UNINSTALL.md:89
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
    sudo rm -f "$SERVICE_FILE"
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege UNINSTALL.md:91
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
    sudo rm -f "$WRAPPER_SCRIPT"
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege UNINSTALL.md:93
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
    sudo rm -f /etc/bash_completion.d/nodo /usr/local/share/zsh/site-functions/_nodo
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege UNINSTALL.md:99
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
    sudo rm -rf "$TARGET_DIR"
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token INSTALL.md:191
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (placeholder value)
    x86_64|amd64) JRE_DIST="Open…ot_${JRE_VER}.tar.gz" ;;
    placeholder
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token INSTALL.md:192
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (placeholder value)
    aarch64|arm64) JRE_DIST="Open…ot_${JRE_VER}.tar.gz" ;;
    placeholder
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process INSTALL.md:350
    Starts a background / autostarted process
    sudo systemctl enable --now nodo.service
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege TROUBLESHOOTING.md:49
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (detector / deny-list definition)
    `sudo bash /nodo/bash/build_ch_initramfs.sh /nodo linux/amd64 /nodo/cloud_hypervisor/initramfs/linux/amd64/initramfs`.
    detector

Files scanned: 13. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
  • warning body-long SKILL.md body ≈ 5073 tokens (recommended < 5000); move details to references/
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "system_requirements"

Process rating: all ten parameters 49/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (celaut-bridge-skill) differs from the folder (celaut)
  • 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, node) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
  • 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 5073 tokens
  • 85Steps. 44 steps, 1 vague phrases
  • 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
  • low The response is described with custom markup (9 tags): a typed call is more reliable

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 314: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 22 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 44 items
  • +4Has examples (18 code blocks)
  • +1License stated

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 62.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This skill is coherent for operating Celaut nodes, but it asks an agent to manage privileged host services and expose sensitive workload observation features that need careful operator review.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 1 Aug 2026