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BC xint-rs

Fast X Intelligence CLI (Rust) — search, analyze, and engage on X/Twitter from the terminal. Use when: (1) user says "x research", "search x for", "search twitter for", "what are people saying about", "what's twitter saying", "check x for", "x search", "search x", (2) user wants real-time monitoring with "watch", (3) user needs AI-powered analysis with Grok ("analyze", "sentiment"), (4) user needs intelligence reports ("report"), (5) user wants to track followers ("diff"), (6) user needs trending topics ("trends"). Also supports: bookmarks, likes, following (OAuth), x-search, collections, CSV/JSON/JSONL export. Non-goals: Not for posting tweets, not for DMs, not for enterprise features.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: 0xNyk v2026.2.26 MIT-0 80 files · 2 scripts body ≈ 2 422 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 4 d ago

As a process C 55/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: inputs and preconditions, failures and branches, running it twice

IntegrationData and analyticsWriting and documentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
83/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
78
Quality 40%
90
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
55/100
Has gaps
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

Exfiltration medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 6

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 6
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell-known-host README.md:34
      Pipe-to-shell installer from a well-known host (still executes remote code)
      curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/0xNyk/xint-rs/main/install.sh | bash
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell-known-host README.md:41
      Pipe-to-shell installer from a well-known host (still executes remote code)
      curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/0xNyk/xint-rs/main/install.sh | bash
    • medium Exfiltration net-redirectable-api-key scripts/xai_x_search_scan.py:24
      Helper sends the API key to a host configured by an environment variable — the key can be redirected to another server
      API key + configurable base URL from environment
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell SKILL.md:71
      Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      - For required tools: prefer OS package managers over `curl | bash` when possible
      quoted
    • low Exfiltration read-dotenv README.md:121
      Reads a .env file
      cp .env.example .env
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token README.md:455
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      `BYLu…vPg`
      quoted

    Files scanned: 80. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "credentials"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "required_env_vars"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "requiredEnvVars"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "primary_credential"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "primaryCredential"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "security"

    Process rating: all ten parameters 55/100

    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 30Running it twice. 2 mutating operations with no state check
    • 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
    • 100Steps. 34 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2422 tokens
    • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • -33 of 3 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +5Description quotes 12 example trigger phrases
    • +4Description says when NOT to use the skill
    • +3Description length 695: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 30 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 34 items
    • +3Output format is stated explicitly
    • +4Has examples (17 code blocks)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 90.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    This is a mostly coherent X/Twitter intelligence CLI, but it needs Review because it requests broad account-write OAuth access and can upload local files or bookmark-derived knowledge to xAI with limited containment.
    LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: benign · 28 May 2026