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CF xint

X Intelligence CLI — search, analyze, and engage on X/Twitter from the terminal. Use when: (1) user says "x research", "search x for", "search twitter for", "what are people saying about", "what's twitter saying", "check x for", "x search", "search x", "find tweets about", "monitor x for", "track followers", (2) user is working on something where recent X discourse would provide useful context (new library releases, API changes, product launches, cultural events, industry drama), (3) user wants to find what devs/experts/community thinks about a topic, (4) user needs real-time monitoring ("watch"), (5) user wants AI-powered analysis ("analyze", "sentiment", "report"), (6) user wants to sync bookmarks to Obsidian ("sync bookmarks", "capture bookmarks", "bookmark research", "save my bookmarks to obsidian"). Also supports: bookmarks, likes, following (read/write), trending topics, Grok AI analysis, and cost tracking. Export as JSON, JSONL (pipeable), CSV, or Markdown. Non-goals: Not for posting tweets, not for DMs, not for enterprise features. Requires OAuth for user-context operations (bookmarks, likes, following, diff).

ClawHub Agent Skills author: 0xNyk v2026.2.26 MIT-0 80 files · 1 script body ≈ 6 462 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process F 51/100 · Will not run — References files that are not bundled: url, references/x-api.md

IntegrationObsidianData and analyticsAI and agentsInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
C
66/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
79
Quality 40%
46
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
F
51/100
Will not run
References files that are not bundled: url, references/x-api.md
Tools and files w 18
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Exfiltration medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

  1. Shorten the description to 1024 characters.
  2. The SKILL.md body is over 5,000 tokens: move reference detail into references/ and load it when needed.
  3. The text references files that are not there: add them or drop the references.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 5

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 5
  • medium Exfiltration net-redirectable-api-key lib/mcp-package-contract.test.ts:14
    Helper sends the API key to a host configured by an environment variable — the key can be redirected to another server
    API key + configurable base URL from environment
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell-known-host README.md:34
    Pipe-to-shell installer from a well-known host (still executes remote code)
    curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/0xNyk/xint/main/install.sh | bash
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell-known-host README.md:41
    Pipe-to-shell installer from a well-known host (still executes remote code)
    curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/0xNyk/xint/main/install.sh | bash
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell SKILL.md:77
    Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    - For Bun: prefer OS package managers over `curl | bash` when possible
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token README.md:527
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    `BYLu…vPg`
    quoted

Files scanned: 80. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • error description-long description is 1136 chars, limit 1024
  • warning body-long SKILL.md body ≈ 6462 tokens (recommended < 5000); move details to references/
  • warning missing-ref reference to a missing file: url
  • warning missing-ref reference to a missing file: references/x-api.md
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "credentials"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "required_env_vars"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "primary_credential"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "security"

Process rating: all ten parameters 51/100

Will not run. References files that are not bundled: url, references/x-api.md
  • 0Tools and files. 2 referenced file(s) missing: url, references/x-api.md
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 30Running it twice. 12 mutating operations with no state check
  • 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
  • 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 6462 tokens
  • 85Steps. 145 steps, 1 vague phrases
  • 100Failures and branches. 1 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
  • low 13 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
  • low The response is described with custom markup (10 tags): a typed call is more reliable

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +3Description length 1135: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +5Description quotes 18 example trigger phrases
  • +4Description says when NOT to use the skill
  • +4Structure: 52 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 145 items
  • +3Output format is stated explicitly
  • +4Has examples (39 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 46.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This X/Twitter research skill also bundles broad account controls, file-upload features, and local server/package-management functions that are not consistently disclosed.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: benign · 28 May 2026