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BC openclaw-whatsapp

WhatsApp bridge for OpenClaw — send/receive messages, auto-reply agents, QR pairing, message search, contact sync

ClawHub Agent Skills author: sam1337 v0.3.0 5 files · 2 scripts body ≈ 1 715 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 4 d ago

As a process C 63/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ReferenceWhatsAppAI and agentsInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
75/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
79
Quality 40%
70
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
63/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
When it triggers w 12
20
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 5

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 5
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell-known-host SKILL.md:33
    Pipe-to-shell installer from a well-known host (still executes remote code)
    curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/0xs4m1337/openclaw-whatsapp/main/install.sh | bash
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege SKILL.md:58
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
    sudo cp "$SKILL_DIR/scripts/wa-notify.sh" /usr/local/bin/wa-notify.sh
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege SKILL.md:59
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
    sudo cp "$SKILL_DIR/scripts/wa-notify-worker.sh" /usr/local/bin/wa-notify-worker.sh
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege SKILL.md:60
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
    sudo chmod +x /usr/local/bin/wa-notify.sh /usr/local/bin/wa-notify-worker.sh
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process scripts/wa-notify.sh:50
    Starts a background / autostarted process
    nohup "$WORKER_PATH" >/dev/null 2>&1 &

Files scanned: 5. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")

Process rating: all ten parameters 63/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 6 mutating operations with no state check
  • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
  • 100Steps. 8 steps
  • 100Failures and branches. 1 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1715 tokens
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 113: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -4Absolute local paths (C:\Users, /home/…): not portable
  • -2localhost URLs: will not work for another user
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 18 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 8 items
  • +4Has examples (16 code blocks)
  • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (1 of 1)
  • +3All 2 scripts are documented

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 70.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This skill is a real WhatsApp bridge, but it asks users to install and run a persistent auto-reply agent with broad access to private messages and account-level sending authority, with weak install and privacy controls.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: suspicious · 28 May 2026