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BC BlogBurst - Virtual CMO Agent

Your AI Chief Marketing Officer. Autonomous agent that runs your entire marketing — auto-posts to Twitter/X, Bluesky, Telegram, Discord, auto-engages with your audience (replies, likes, follows), runs SEO/GEO audits, tracks competitors, scans communities for opportunities, learns what works, and continuously optimizes. 50+ countries, 1000+ posts published. Free tier available.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: 0xspeter v1.0.0 MIT-0 4 files body ≈ 4 487 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 4 d ago

As a process C 50/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, consistency

AnalyzerDiscordTelegramAI and agentsMarketingInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
82/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
96
Quality 40%
61
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
50/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
30
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 4

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 4
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-shell-rc SKILL.md:28
    Writes to a shell startup file (documentation of a security skill)
    echo 'export BLOGBURST_API_KEY="your-key"' >> ~/.zshrc && source ~/.zshrc
    security skill

A further 3 matches are quotations in this security skill's documentation and are not counted as findings.

Files scanned: 4. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning name-format name should be kebab-case (lowercase letters, digits, hyphens)
  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "homepage"

Process rating: all ten parameters 50/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 30Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 30Running it twice. 10 mutating operations with no state check
  • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (BlogBurst - Virtual CMO Agent) differs from the folder (blogburst-3-1-2)
  • 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 60Failures and branches. 2 branches
  • 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 4487 tokens
  • 100Steps. 57 steps
  • low 19 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -5TODO / placeholder text left in the skill
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 379: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 28 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 57 items
  • +4Has examples (21 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 61.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
BlogBurst appears to be a real marketing automation skill, but it asks for broad authority over social accounts and handles credentials and autonomous actions with too little scoping.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026