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AD tyrpay-buyer-skill

Buyer-side TyrPay workflow for LLM agents. Create tasks, optionally wait for seller commitment, fund tasks explicitly, monitor settlement, and request refunds.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: CD v0.1.8 MIT-0 5 files body ≈ 676 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 4 d ago

As a process D 49/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ProcedureAI and agentsCommerceInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
A
90/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
94
Quality 40%
85
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
49/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Risky intent medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The purpose itself is risky: wallets, browser password stores, offensive security. Even an honest implementation gives the agent access to things that cost money.

For the author

Explain in the description why the access is needed and how it is limited; add tests that show refusals on dangerous requests.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 2

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 2
    • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets references/tool-reference.md:53
      Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
      | `BUYER_PRIVATE_KEY` | Buyer wallet private key (hex, with or without 0x prefix). Used to create the ethers Signer. | |
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token references/tool-reference.md:55
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (documentation table row)
      | `SETTLEMENT_CONTRACT` | Deployed TyrPaySettlement contract address on the settlement chain. Passed as `settlementAddress` to the BuyerSdk constructor. | `0x6D…ad9`
      table

    Files scanned: 5. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 49/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 30Running it twice. 10 mutating operations with no state check
    • 55Failures and branches. 1 branches
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 100Steps. 23 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 676 tokens

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • +4No input/output examples
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 159: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 7 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 23 items
    • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (1 of 1)
    • +1License stated

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 85.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    This is a coherent TyrPay buyer payment skill, but it gives an agent wallet-based payment authority without clear spending caps or human approval gates.
    LLM: suspicious (medium) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026