SKILLEMALL.ai

BF validation-rule-management

管理校验规则、规则组和校验场景的全流程操作。支持通过统一 CLI 工具快速执行 API 调用,自动处理参数解析、配置加载和错误提示。使用当用户需要进行校验规则管理、规则组维护、校验场景配置、启停操作或相关查询时,即使用户只说"帮我创建一条规则"或"查一下场景列表"也应触发。

ClawHub Agent Skills author: lcc v1.0.0 MIT-0 13 files body ≈ 743 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 3 d ago

As a process F 31/100 · Will not run — weak spots: steps, result and completion, when it triggers

IntegrationInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
88/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
95
Quality 40%
78
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
F
31/100
Will not run
Steps w 15
0
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Exfiltration medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 1

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 1
  • medium Exfiltration net-redirectable-api-key lib/api-client.js:12
    Helper sends the API key to a host configured by an environment variable — the key can be redirected to another server
    API key + configurable base URL from environment

Files scanned: 12. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")

Process rating: all ten parameters 31/100

  • 0Steps. Prose only: no discrete steps
  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, node) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 743 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3No numbered steps or checklist
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +5Description quotes 2 example trigger phrases
  • +3Description length 137: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 10 headings
  • +4Has examples (9 code blocks)
  • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (2 of 2)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 78.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This appears to be a legitimate validation-rule administration skill, but it can change or delete remote business rules without built-in confirmation safeguards.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026